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A psychological model of mental disorder 
 
Abstract 
A coherent conceptualisation of the role of psychological factors is of great 
importance in understanding mental disorder. Academic papers and professional 
reports alluding to psychological models of the aetiology of mental disorder are 
becoming increasingly common, and there is evidence of a marked policy shift 
towards the provision of psychological therapies and interventions.  
This paper discusses the relationship between biological, social and 
psychological factors in the causation and treatment of mental disorder. It argues that 
simple biological reductionism is not scientifically justified, and also that the specific 
role of psychological processes within the biopsychosocial model requires further 
elaboration. The biopsychosocial model is usually interpreted as implying that 
biological, social and psychological factors are co-equal partners in the aetiology of 
mental disorder. The psychological model of mental disorder presented here suggests 
that disruption or dysfunction in psychological processes is a final common pathway 
in the development of mental disorder. These processes include, but are not limited to, 
cognitive processes. The model proposes that biological and environmental factors, 
together with a person‟s personal experiences, lead to mental disorder through their 
conjoint effects on these psychological processes. 
Implications for research, interventions and policy are discussed. 
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A psychological model of mental disorder 
 
Introduction 
 The past few years have seen a massive investment of research and 
development efforts in the field of mental disorder. It is estimated that in the UK, the 
National Health Service spends about £219 million per year on mental health 
research
1
, and mental disorder has been estimated to cost the state £77 billion per 
year
2
.  
 On July 25, 1989, President George Bush designated the 1990s the „Decade of 
the Brain‟. The European Community Council of Ministers3 swiftly followed. Recent 
advances in imaging techniques such as computed tomography (CT), magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) have been hailed 
as offering great potential for detailed neuroanatomical investigations of many 
disorders
4
. Research into biological aspects of mental disorder is welcome. However 
it is important that this research is properly integrated with psychological and social 
accounts of mental disorder. Some observers point to a threat of a retrenchment into a 
reductionist, biomedical approach to mental disorder
5
. It has been argued that 
diagnostic and etiological accounts stemming from a simple biomedical approach will 
be partial and scientifically inadequate
6
. Ill-informed reductionist accounts may lead 
readers to an unfortunate perception that mental health care is both lacking in 
humanistic sensibilities and dehumanising
7
. 
Psychological approaches to mental disorder offer alternative perspectives and 
can also be integrated with biological perspectives. Indeed, this paper will suggest that 
a comprehensive psychological model of mental disorder can offer a coherent and 
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assertive alternative to purely reductionist biological accounts that nevertheless 
incorporates biological research.  
Most biomedical theories and most biomedical interventions in mental 
disorder explicitly or implicitly relate to synaptic or intracellular processes
8
. Thus 
abnormalities in neurotransmitter functioning are implicated in theoretical models and 
drug treatments (selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors etc) target synaptic 
neurotransmitters in the search for effective treatment. In contrast, psychological 
approaches focus on associative networks, based in the neural substrate, but 
developed through learning and relying on theories of conditioning, perception, 
appraisal and belief-formation, propositional and implicational encoding, mental 
models of the world, internalised schemas of relationships etc. Psychological models 
of mental disorder, therefore, address different kinds of mechanisms, but also strive to 
encompass more than the mere mechanics of any individual system and to look at 
interactions and interrelationships. 
Over the past few years a number of reports by professional bodies, strategy 
documents from policy makers and proposed changes in legislation all stress the role 
of psychologists and of psychological perspectives in mental health. As an example, 
the first national clinical guidance issued by the UK‟s National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence concerned the frontline treatment of schizophrenia
9
. Amongst other 
important comments, this document recommended that “100%” of people in receipt of 
the diagnosis of schizophrenia should be offered cognitive behavioural therapy (p55). 
Recent academic reviews of the role of psychosocial influences on mental illnesses 
and psychotic experiences
10
 and major grant-funded randomised controlled trials have 
repeatedly demonstrated the effectiveness of psychological therapeutic approaches in 
a range of mental health problems
11, 12, 13
.  
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 Psychological formulation is the summation and integration of the knowledge 
that is acquired through the assessment process
14
. Psychological formulations attempt 
to explain why people are experiencing difficulties. They usually consist of a list of 
problems and possible psychological reasons for these
15
. Typically, formulations 
examine the events of people‟s lives, and how the individuals have interpreted and 
reacted to these. Formulations are hypotheses about the nature and origin of problems, 
which are tested out over time
16
, and therefore tend to change over the course of both 
assessment and therapy. Psychological case formulations are complex and may 
comprise a number of provisional hypotheses, based on a large variety of 
psychological theories, each drawing on scientific research.  
The use of psychological formulations is not synonymous with being a clinical 
psychologist, and is certainly not incompatible with being a psychiatrist. Many 
individual clinical psychologists may fail to provide psychological formulations. 
Many medically-trained psychiatrists welcome formulation; either as an adjunct to 
diagnosis – the iconic DSM-IV17 suggests that diagnosis is only a start – or, as some 
psychiatrists propose, as an alternative to diagnosis
18
. Psychological models of mental 
disorder could inform the practice of all workers in the mental health services, but 
they should be coherent. It is axiomatic that psychologists welcome the inclusion of 
specifically psychological elements in psychiatric formulations. The questions are 
how that should be done and what constitute coherent psychological models of mental 
disorder.  
 It is worthwhile briefly mentioning the biopsychosocial model in psychiatry. 
This is primarily associated with the work of George Engel
7
, who attempted to 
provide a scientific account of mental disorder that could challenge a reductionist 
biological account. The biopsychosocial model therefore suggested that mental 
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disorder emerges from a human system that has both physical elements (a biological 
nervous system) and psychosocial elements (relationships, family, community and 
wider society)
19, 20
. 
 The biopsychosocial model was widely adopted
21, 22, 23
. Inevitable micro-
historical pressures such as a professional revolt against so-called antipsychiatrists
24, 
25, 26
 has meant that some of the gloss has worn off the biopsychosocial model. 
Antipsychiatry remains vocal
27, 18, 28
 while, conversely, biodeterminist writings are 
also common
8
. Wing, in particular, appeared to feel the need to defend diagnosis, to 
assert the biomedical basis of psychiatric disorders and the utility of a „diagnose and 
treat‟ approach29. 
 The emphasis within the biopsychosocial model on social and psychological 
perspectives in addition to biological aspects of mental disorder may be welcome. 
However, consideration needs to be given to how, in each case, the elements – bio-, 
psycho-, and social- – relate one to another. The biopsychosocial model is, or should 
be, more than a simple statement that these three aspects should be included in a 
formulation. In particular, it has been argued that the biopsychosocial model has been 
interpreted in practice as reserving a dominant position for biomedical approaches
5
, 
where indeed social and psychological factors are acknowledged and given 
prominence, but are considered to be moderators of the direct causal role of biological 
processes. This „primacy‟ of biomedical causation30 has been cited as an argument for 
the professional superiority of one profession over others
31
.  This wider sociological 
debate over the implications of particular epistemological approaches has, of course, 
been a source of some tension
32
. 
 This paper argues that the role of psychological and social processes in mental 
disorder requires further attention. The biopsychosocial model does not address the 
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issues of the nature of the interrelationships between elements. Importantly, it fails to 
address issues related to the different status and nature of the different elements – the 
unresolved issue of „primacy‟. The nature of psychological factors itself needs further 
attention. This includes a consideration of the different functions psychological 
factors can play in different models of mental disorders: as causes, as symptoms and 
as possible therapeutic factors. 
Such consideration may, paradoxically, rationalise and contextualise the role 
of biochemical aspects. The biopsychosocial model fails properly to address 
biological accounts of mental disorder if it cannot relate, for example, how 
monoamine abnormalities in depression
33
 relate to findings of low self-esteem
34
 and 
negative thinking patterns
35, 36
 and findings of greatly increased incidences of mental 
disorder in disadvantaged groups
37
. A coherent model of the links between these 
findings – which should emerge from a coherent psychological model of mental 
disorder – should also ensure that biological approaches to mental disorder are given 
proper regard. 
 What, then, is a psychological conceptualisation of mental disorder? Is there a 
coherent, simple, model of mental health that simultaneously elucidates the 
psychological perspective and contrasts it with that of other approaches? What would 
a generic psychological model of mental disorder look like? Could a coherent account 
of the role of psychological factors in mental disorder also help the development of an 
integrative model of mental disorder; in which multiple causal factors, different 
symptomatic markers and different therapeutic elements are all appropriately 
addressed? 
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Multiple causes of mental disorder 
 The biopsychosocial model is based on is the notion of multiple simultaneous 
causes of mental disorder. Clinical and research evidence supports this assumption, as 
will be discussed below. Any proposed generic psychological model must 
acknowledge this. One can imagine something along the lines of a theoretical multiple 
regression equation, with mental ill health as the dependent (predicted variable). One 
might even imagine measuring such disorder on a numeric scale ranging from zero to 
100 or perfect mental health. One can imagine further three possible independent or 
predictor variables. The biopsychosocial model, and the model proposed here, 
includes multitude causes – multitude predictors. Nevertheless, one can imagine for 
the purposes of this argument three main classes of predictor variables (biological, 
social and circumstantial) as illustrated in Figure 1a. It is worth noting that these 
classes of causal or predictor variables are slightly different from the components of 
the biopsychosocial model. As will be clarified below, this reflects two important 
modifications to the biopsychosocial model: the distinction between psychological 
processes and personally significant life events, and the specific status given to the 
disruption of psychological processes as a final common pathway to mental disorder. 
________________________ 
FIGURE 1a ABOUT HERE 
________________________ 
 
All of these classes of variables are causally related to mental ill health. 
Clearly, biological factors are important in mental health. Links between genetics, 
biochemical abnormalities, neuroanatomical abnormalities or merely the structure and 
functioning of the physical brain and mental disorder have been studied extensively. 
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Some authors have argued that, while biological variables have explanatory power in 
cases of mental disorder, psychosocial aspects merely account for human experiences 
that do not amount to clinically significant disorders
30
.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all possible biological factors 
causal in all possible forms of mental disorder. It is worth noting that these cannot be 
dismissed. As just one example, a variety of problems from unipolar depression
38
 
through bipolar disorder
39
 to schizophrenia
40
 have been associated reliably with 
genetic heritability. In the hypothetical multiple regression equation suggested above, 
therefore, it is likely that an imaginary predictor variable capturing the population‟s 
biomedical variance would be a significant predictor of variance in mental ill health. 
 Equally, we have evidence that social and environmental factors contribute to 
mental disorder. Again, the number of studies is enormous, but there are clear links 
between poor housing
41
 and poverty and unemployment
42
 and environmental stress 
and the expression of a wide range of mental health problems. In simple terms there is 
considerable evidence of an association between mental disorder and the experience 
of poverty and deprivation
43, 44, 45
. In our hypothetical example, a general and 
portmanteau measure of disadvantageous social environment would clearly be a 
significant predictor of variance in mental ill health. 
 An environmental, or social environmental, causal variable can be seen as 
occupying the space of psychiatric sociology – examining and contextualising social 
and environmental causes of mental disorder
46
. When people refer to psychological 
issues, they sometimes refer to the effects of potentially life-shaping experiences that 
impact on mental health – childhood sexual abuse47, bullying48, attachment relations 
with parents
49
, assault
50
 and all other major and minor interpersonal experiences. 
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Although these are disparate kinds of event, it remains true that life events in general 
contribute to mental disorder
51, 52
. 
Because of the breadth of these experiences, it may be difficult to capture 
them all on one hypothetical dimension. Nevertheless, in our hypothetical multiple 
regression equation, again, it is likely that an imaginary predictor variable capturing 
these potentially damaging cumulative life events would also be a significant 
predictor of variance in mental disorder. This represents one important meaning of the 
term „psychological‟ as it is used in this context – as a reference to the causal role of 
psychosocial factors in the development of mental disorders.  
A simple statement that biological factors, social factors and life events all 
contribute to the development of mental ill health does not take us further than the 
biopsychosocial model. Two further important further points are necessary, reflecting 
the specific psychological nature of the model proposed here. 
 First, people from different professional and academic backgrounds may well 
differ as to their hypotheses about the relative importance of the putative predictor 
variables.  
One example of this is the current interest in genetics. As commented above, 
genetic aspects of mental disorder are important. However, the apparently bare facts 
themselves appear frequently to be overstated, and the concept of heritability itself 
can be misleading when applied to psychological phenomena. For example, the 
heritability of psychotic disorders has been quoted as being as high as .85
53
. This 
figure is commonly taken to imply that 85% of the variance in the presentation of the 
symptoms of psychosis can be statistically attributed to the variance in the 
population's genome. This may be misleading. Rutter
54
 cogently argues that 
psychosocial, environmental and developmental influences on mental disorder are 
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significant. He points out that some of the assumptions behind molecular genetics 
research do not translate easily into lay language (for example, genetic effects plus 
environmental effects do not necessarily sum to 100%). This, Rutter argues, may lead 
to subtly but important misrepresentations of biological findings when discussed in 
contexts such as the present discussion. It is not necessarily correct, for instance, to 
suggest that social background, life events and psychological factors together could 
explain only the „remaining‟ 15% of the variance in the presentation of the symptoms 
of psychosis. 
Biological, social, circumstantial and psychological variables also interact. 
Personal vulnerability factors such as neuroticism
55
 may make a person more 
emotionally responsive to life events. Similarly, the social support buffer hypothesis
56
 
suggests that the level of a person‟s available social support buffers the impact of 
environmental stressors on mental health. Thus, for two individuals experiencing 
stressful events, the person with the greatest level of social support will experience 
lower levels of mental disorder. A similar set of interactions may explain the often 
commented upon fact that the concordance rates for monozygotic twins for no mental 
disorder is 100%
57
. So a biomedical dominance of explanatory models of mental 
disorder is not inevitable. Social factors and the influence of life events may be just as 
important.  
 
The psychological consequences of biological abnormalities  
A discussion of the role of biological factors in mental disorder in no way 
undermines the psychological model proposed here. The role of biological variables 
are acknowledged, but placed into a proper relationship with respect to other factors. 
In the case of hallucinations, there is a fascinating story emerging. Biologically, there 
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is considerable evidence of a genetic element in schizophrenia
40
. Schizophrenia in 
general, psychotic symptoms more specifically and hallucinations in particular have 
been linked with cerebral lateralisation
58
. It has been claimed that people who hear 
voices are more likely to have poorly lateralised cerebral hemispheres, more 
specifically still that the language areas of the brain appear to be less lateralised in 
people who hear voices
59
. It is entirely credible that biochemical or neuroanatomical 
or genetic abnormalities lead to poor lateralisation of language processing and hence 
to the problems associated with a diagnosis of schizophrenia
60
. Since one key task in 
neural language processing is presumably the identification and localisation of 
perceptual experiences, this failure of lateralisation seems to lead to problems in the 
discrimination of voice (heard) from other forms of cognition (thought or 
remembered). Psychologically, this is a failure or a disruption of a psychological 
process – source monitoring or source attribution or reality monitoring61.  
Biological factors cannot therefore be excluded, or even minimised, in the 
development of hallucinations. Few people would dispute that auditory hallucinations 
are psychological phenomena. This analysis suggests that hearing voices cannot be 
thought of as a psychological phenomenon only in terms of effect or nature, but also 
in terms of process. The final, inevitable, pathway to hearing disembodied voices is 
the misattribution of the source of percepts. This is a psychological process. It is 
influenced by biological factors, but it is equally influenced by social environmental 
factors and the important events in a person‟s learning history. The point of this 
example is not to discuss cerebral asymmetry in hallucinations, but to illustrate that a 
plausible biological pathway from genetics, through neurology to behaviour 
necessarily implicates psychological processes. Biological factors influence mental 
disorder through their impact on psychological processes. 
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Similar augments can be advanced for the relationship between environmental 
or social factors and the disruption of psychological processes. Living in poor social 
circumstances leads to mental disorder because such social circumstances impact 
upon psychological processes. Life events impact on mental health through their 
impact upon psychological processes. These arguments also apply to a wide range of 
problems under the general aegis of mental ill health.  
Abnormalities in serotonin metabolism are implicated in depression
62
. For 
example a tryptophan-reducing (serotonin-reducing) diet can induce depression
63
. In 
the psychological model of mental disorder proposed here, this association is 
accepted, but the causal role of biology is effected through the disruption of 
psychological processes. Thus a reduction in dietary tryptophan leads to a reduction in 
available cerebral serotonin. Serotonin is implicated in the neurological mechanisms 
supporting a number of important appraisal processes. It is entirely plausible to 
suggest that these appraisals will include the ways people see themselves, their world 
and their future – the negative cognitive triad of the cognitive model of depression35. 
Thus the biological tryptophan-serotonin system could indeed lead to depression, but 
through psychological processes.  
 Similar arguments place the disruption of psychological processes in a central 
role when the effects of social or experiential factors are considered. In the case of 
social factors, a psychological model of mental disorder based on the principle that 
mental disorder arises from the disturbance or disruption of psychological processes 
accepts that living in disadvantaged social circumstances does indeed lead to 
problems such as depression. In this case, however, poverty and social deprivation 
appears to lead to disillusionment, hopelessness and learned helplessness; a realisation 
that there is little or nothing that one can do to improve or change one‟s lot in life, and 
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perhaps even that one‟s actions have no effect or purpose64, 65, 66. Depression is of 
course a consequence, but is a direct consequence of the disruption of psychological 
processes.  
 And finally the same applies to experience. Of course being assaulted by one‟s 
parents leads to problems (frequently, again, depression). But psychologists would 
argue that the association between cause (assault) and the effect (mental disorder) is 
again mediated by the disruption or malformation of psychological processes. In the 
case of the impact of sexual, emotional or physical abuse, this is likely to impact on 
the ways in which the children (and later the adults) appraise themselves, the 
important people in their lives, their actions and the consequences of their actions and 
the ways in which relationships and social intercourse should be governed – their 
cognitive schemas
67
. Indeed, there is convincing evidence
68
 that assaults that mirror 
childhood events reactivate such cognitive schemas with terrible consequences.  
 It is important, here, to stress that these psychological processes are not just 
cognitive. Cognitive processes are important (and in vogue) and the impacts of writers 
such as Beck
35
, Seligman
69
 and Young
67
 are undeniable. Disruptions or disturbances 
in psychological processes other than cognitive processes have, however, been 
stressed by other psychologists and psychiatrists. The phenomenon of „learned 
helplessness‟ has been referred to earlier, and is closely associated with Seligman‟s 
cognitive approach
69
, but learned helplessness itself was initially analysed as a 
behavioural phenomenon
70
.  Purely behavioural models of depression have a 
distinguished history
71
 and remain highly regarded
72
, and behavioural elements are a 
key part of conventional cognitive behavioural therapy. 
Psychodynamic approaches – which, within the model presented here, invoke 
the disruption or disturbance of object relations, sexual drives or other intrapsychic 
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events under the legend „psychological processes‟ – similarly have a distinguished 
history, have been massively influential on modern psychology and are currently a 
core part of the practice and ethos of clinical psychologists
73
. In the example of 
depressed mood used here, the psychodynamic notions of depression as involving, for 
instance, disrupted object relations
74
 or involuted anger remain respectable elements 
of psychological formulations
75
. In the case of personality disorders, although most 
recent psychological accounts of personality problems cite maladaptive cognitive 
schemata concerning social relationships
76, 68
, other writers have cited failures to 
integrate personality structure
77
, and disruptions of psychodynamic processes related 
to fundamental object relations
78
. In the model presented here, therefore, disruption of 
psychological process is certainly not limited to disruption of cognitive process. 
 
Psychological processes 
 A generic psychological model of mental disorder proposes that all of these 
three putative causes have their effects by their actions in disrupting or disturbing 
psychological processes. This relationship applies not only in the case of biological 
factors, but equally for social and experiential factors. This central conceptual point is 
illustrated in Figure 1b.  
 
________________________ 
FIGURE 1b ABOUT HERE 
________________________ 
 
A truly psychological approach has always separated events from the 
interpretation of events. The model proposed here neatly separates events from the 
A psychological model of mental disorder 
Page 16 
 
 
psychological processes that interpret, buffer and act consequentially upon these 
events. Like the biopsychosocial model, it also attempts to address the interactions 
between these classes of causal variables. Biological, social and circumstantial factors 
are all important and are all presumed to interact. Importantly, however, in this model 
it is the conjoint impact of these interacting factors on psychological processes that 
lead to mental disorder. 
This, important, point is worth elaborating. The model developed here implies 
not only that the common symptoms of psychiatric classifications are psychological in 
nature (that hallucinations, depression, anxiety etc are themselves psychological 
phenomena), but also that psychological processes – or rather disturbances or 
dysfunctions in psychological processes – are necessarily responsible for shaping the 
nature, extent and type of the phenomena described collectively as mental disorder. 
This means that, as in the biopsychosocial model, multiple causal factors are 
implicated. Thus, in a hypothetical consideration of depression, several distal causal 
factors may be salient, and several key psychological processes may be implicated. It 
is possible to hypothesise that social deprivation and childhood maltreatment, genetic 
vulnerability and biochemical insult may all contribute to the onset of depression. 
These factors may all impinge on psychological processes of self-esteem 
maintenance, self-efficacy beliefs and expectancies of reward (for example). They 
may implicate neuroanatomical systems responsible for reward and reinforcement, 
autobiographical memory and social cognition, and they may involve 
neuroanatomical systems that involve serotonin (as well, of course, as other 
neurotransmitters). Depression, in the model presented here, is characterised neither 
as a direct consequence of the neuroanatomical mechanisms, nor of the contributing 
social circumstances. Rather, these neuroanatomical mechanisms and circumstances 
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are viewed as being important influences on the psychological mechanisms of reward 
and reinforcement, social cognition and maintenance of self-esteem. And it is 
dysfunctions or disturbances of the se psychological processes that are seen as 
ultimately leading to the mental disorder – depression. 
This argument can be applied to hallucinations. Abnormalities in the poorly-
lateralised speech areas of the brain, probably involving dopaminergic systems, and 
potential abnormalities in frontal functioning could, theoretically, lead to difficulties 
in source-monitoring (detecting whether particular precepts are internal or external in 
origin). Social circumstances similar to those that are risk factors for other mental 
disorders may, in this model, interact with these biological variables in a number of 
complex ways – but most likely through the generation of emotive negative intrusive 
thoughts. Once again, however, in the model presented here, the experience of 
hallucination is seen as a product of a psychological act – the misattribution of the 
origin of a percept. No one would deny that the distal causative factors could (at the 
very least hypothetically) affect this source-monitoring process. In the model 
presented here, however, these distal causal factors do not „cause hallucinations‟, they 
perturb the psychological processes, and it is the perturbations in these psychological 
processes that lead to – that „cause‟ – the phenomena that are labelled mental 
disorder. 
And, as a third illustration, the same principle holds true in personality 
disorder. Innate or heritable individual differences in personality trait (for instance 
increased levels of the trait of neuroticism) may be exacerbated by events (for 
example experiencing childhood abuse) to precipitate more extreme personality 
dysfunction in later life. In the model presented here, however, it would be 
inappropriate to say that either the biological traits, or the life events or even the 
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combination of these has produced or caused a personality disorder. Rather, in the 
present model, this combination of distal circumstances has profoundly affected how 
the person perceives themselves, their world and their relationship with others. It is 
this element, the perturbation of psychological process, which leads to mental ill 
health. 
 
Weaknesses and possible criticisms of such a model  
Perspective 
Philosophers of science consistently maintain that, even in supposedly 
objective science, the interests and allegiances of the researcher may shape claims of 
causality
79
. This is particularly pertinent in the case of mental health
80
. If a person is 
„depressed‟ and has „low self-esteem‟, it is easy to see two professionals maintaining 
opposing points of view: on the one hand the depression is viewed as having caused 
the lowered self-esteem, on the other the depression is seen as a consequence of the 
negative self-evaluation. Many philosophers of science as applied to psychiatry 
conclude that „truth‟ is dependent on perspective81. 
In the case of the model presented here, of course, psychological processes are 
given centre stage. It could be argued that this reflects nothing more than a 
perspective focussed upon psychology. That, alone, would not render the model 
invalid. A coherent statement of the nature of psychological causation, whether or not 
there were other perspectives, would be entirely appropriate. But the model presented 
here makes a further, more specific, claim. It states that disruption of psychological 
processes is a necessary final element in the origin of mental disorder. This is a 
testable hypothesis: if true, all mental disorder will be associated with disruption of 
mental processes, and such disruption will mediate the effects of biological factors on 
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observed symptoms. And, as Karl Popper
79
 suggested, such testable hypotheses 
separate subjectivity from science. 
 
‘Truly organic’ disorders 
While some readers may allow that a model such as this could fit relatively 
well to disorders such as anxiety and depression, it may be claimed that there are 
„truly organic‟ disorders that offer a more direct challenge. Disorders such as Down‟s 
syndrome and phenylketonuria are unequivocally genetic in origin. In these cases, 
could it genuinely be argued that psychological factors are a final, necessary, common 
pathway? In addition to cause, it could be argued that the interventions are social and 
medical rather than predominately psychological. Therapy does not ameliorate the 
disorders, medical care, and, particularly, social care is important.  
Moreover, in the case of phenylketonuria, the consequences of the undoubted 
genetic cause of the condition can be (largely) ameliorated by the social (or social and 
biological) manipulation of removing all foods containing phenylalanine. How, then, 
could psychological factors intrude as a final common element? 
First, the model presented here does not claim that „therapy‟ is the touchstone 
of a psychological model. What care services must do is perform a proper formulation 
of the problem and address the observed functional elements. Clearly the most 
therapeutic intervention should be employed. But this does not necessarily impute 
causality. But more importantly, why might Down‟s syndrome and phenylketonuria 
be considered at all in a discussion of mental disorder? There are many genetic 
disorders. What characterises these two disorders is the consequence on mental 
processes, of the genetic problems. If phenylketonuria did not affect learning and 
behaviour, it would still be a genetic disorder, but it would not be a mental disorder. 
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Cystic fibrosis is a genetic disorder with a complex therapeutic imperative, but it is 
not a mental disorder.  
The model presented here does not rely on the refutation of any genetic 
component to a given mental disorder for the psychological component to be key  – 
quite the reverse. It does not suggest that, equally, that all mental disorders should be 
amenable to psychotherapy. What it suggests is that a mental disorder is characterised 
by the disruption of psychological process. Down‟s syndrome and phenylketonuria 
occur because of genetic abnormalities. But it is clear that these genetic abnormalities 
(if not addressed through diet, of course) will disrupt psychological processes, 
especially learning and information processing. So, in the case of Down‟s syndrome 
and phenylketonuria, biological factors are causal and social interventions are the 
treatments of choice. Nevertheless, these interventions are necessary precisely 
because the organic consequences of the genetic abnormalities disrupt the patients‟ 
psychological processes. 
 
Biology as a final common pathway 
In an influential paper, Eric Kandel
82
 reaffirmed the biological basis of 
psychiatry. In that paper, Kandel proposed a model of psychiatry that is, in essence, 
diametrically opposed to the model presented here. Kandel not only argued that 
organic or biological factors were important in most forms of mental disorder, but 
more fundamentally that alterations in biological functioning (as opposed to 
psychological functioning) are the final common pathway for mental disorder and 
indeed therapy.  
Kandel emphasises (as the model presented here emphasises) how biological 
factors can impact upon psychological functioning – emotions, cognitions and 
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behaviour. But he also emphasises the brain-based nature of psychology. He stresses 
how all emotions, all cognitions and all behaviour depends on brain functioning. 
Kandel points out that in a real, scientific, sense, all learning involves structural 
changes in the brain – changes in synaptic responsively at the very least, and possibly 
more gross neuroanatomical change. He therefore logically deduces that any 
psychological causation of mental disorder must be organic in essence, and any 
therapy, even psychotherapy, must achieve its effect through biology. Kandel not only 
argues  (as the present model argues) that biological changes affect psychological 
processes, he argues that learned patterns of behaviour or self-evaluative schemata 
learned in childhood reflect physical changes in the neural associative networks. He 
moreover argues that any re-learning occurring during therapy represents changes in 
these neuroanatomical associative networks. 
Clearly, this analysis must be true on one level. Any learning must, at the 
molecular and synaptic level, be based on biological changes (the brain is, of course, 
involved). But this is an intellectually trivial type of argument. Since all learning – all 
human behaviour – is dependent on the functioning of the brain, it is redundant to 
suggest that the brain must be involved. An alternative approach might suggest that 
biological factors underpin all forms of associative learning, and therefore each 
particular learned association. To associate a caress with comfort and a sense of 
security is learned, and that learning has a biological substantiation in the brain. 
Equally, perhaps for someone who has survived abuse in childhood, a caress may be 
associated with fear, powerlessness and self-loathing. Again this associative learning 
will necessarily be based on biological substrates. But the difference between learning 
to associate a caress with fear on the one hand and contentment on the other cannot 
best be explained in terms of biological factors.  
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Other authors may go further than Kandel. It may be argued that all 
psychological concepts will disappear from the psychiatric lexicon as phlogiston has 
disappeared from physics – as we understand the neural basis of behaviour, we will 
have no need for the notion of psychology
83
. These arguments have been made 
before, and again there are three main refutations. First, the available data suggest that 
psychological factors (for example the presence or absence of certain dysfunctional 
beliefs) predict variance in the observed symptoms of mental disorder. It is important, 
intellectually and practically, to understand the links between these variables and the 
biological substrate, but their predictive power indicates that, in any meaningful 
sense, they exist. Second, psychological variables implicated in mental disorder are no 
less dependent on neurological processes than are the psychological elements of 
normal life: competition, love, honour, guilt, etc. It may be the case that 
fundamentalist neurological theories of mental disorder would wish to explain away 
these concepts as mental phlogiston, but few others share this ambition. 
But most centrally, many commentators
84, 85, 86
 have addressed this issue by 
pointing out that mental disorders are, in their essence, human rather than brain 
phenomena. Reductive terms fail to capture the essence of human experience because 
it is more than the sum of its biologic parts.  
 
A pluralistic model 
 In the face of coherent arguments that biology serves as a „final common 
pathway‟ to mental disorder, and similar social model of mental disorder23, it may be 
argued that a pluralistic model of mental disorder – not a psychological model – is 
needed. This may be true. It is not the purpose of the present paper. Kandel
82
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presented a coherent and valuable biological model of mental disorder. This is a 
complement. 
 The impetus for the development of the model presented here was a frustration 
with the biopsychosocial model. Most descriptions of the biopsychosocial model also 
fail to address the causal interrelatedness of these variables – biology, the social 
environment, life events and psychological processes are all important, but they are 
not independent factors. Consequently, a pluralistic model that emphasised a false 
equivalence of these elements would have the benefits of the original biopsychosocial 
model, but all its flaws as well.  
 Finally, of course, the model presented here is integrative. Biological and 
social factors are properly acknowledged. It would be pleasing to hope that this model 
might itself be seen as pluralistic. The model presented in this paper, however, does 
place central emphasis on psychology. If that fact were to prevent this model from 
being regarded as pluralistic, that would be unfortunate. Ultimately, however, 
pluralism may emerge from a concurrent reading of models such as that proposed by 
Kandel and models such as that presented here. 
 
 
Implications of such a model 
 
Conceptualisation 
 
Models such as the one presented here are valid if they are useful. It has been 
powerfully argued
84, 87, 88
 that pragmatism should be the benchmark of evaluating 
theoretical models of mental disorder. This model might be useful in guiding thought. 
It offers a conceptual model that allows clinicians to separate and integrate multiple of 
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causes of mental disorder. Rather than proposing a simple „biological cause and 
psychological symptom‟ approach, this model separates causes from mediating 
processes from effects. The model presented here has clear similarities to Padesky and 
Greenberger‟s “five factor model”, widely used in cognitive therapy training89. That 
model proposed five important elements in mental disorder – environment, cognition, 
affect, behaviour and physiology. It contends that a full understanding of these five 
factors is vital for a complete formulation. The separation of affective, behavioural 
and cognitive aspects of „psychology‟ within this model is particularly important. The 
weakness of the five-factor model, however, is that it fails to specify the nature of the 
interrelationships between these aspects.  
In the biopsychosocial model, although it is expected that all three elements 
contribute to the experience of mental disorder, it is not a necessary logical conclusion 
that psychological factors are central. The model proposed here is different. Even if, 
as some biological psychiatrists might argue, biological factors account for the 
majority of the variance in the occurrence of a particular form of mental disorder – for 
instance if one contends that neurodevelopmental abnormalities cause schizophrenia – 
the model presented here would retain the disruption of psychological processes as a 
logically necessary final step. This is not a necessary conclusion from the traditional 
biopsychosocial model. 
 But, although it may be interesting to discuss conceptual issues, models are 
only worthy of real attention if they serve practical functions. Indeed, one of the 
criticisms of the biopsychosocial model itself is that it fails to lead to practical 
answers. But the model presented here does have practical consequences. 
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Research 
In terms of research effort, the model presented here might be useful. Firstly, 
this model is, inter alia, a suggestion that psychology is key. Research into 
psychological factors in mental disorder should, it would follow, be prioritised. 
But it might also be wise to structure research efforts more thoughtfully. 
Research into specific causes of mental disorder is vital and important. Research, for 
instance, might be conducted into the biological influences on source monitoring and 
simultaneously into the relationships between source monitoring and the experience 
of hallucinations. At the same time, we might investigate other (non-biological) 
influences on source monitoring, and other psychological processes implicated in 
hallucinations and other phenomena of mental disorder. For instance, there is 
evidence that disruption of executive thought processes impinge on thought disorder, 
considered a psychotic phenomenon
90
.  Such a strategy would not contradict existing 
research programmes, but might offer a rational conceptual structure.   
Paradoxically, the model of mental disorder proposed here may help explicate 
the mode of action of biological factors. For example, as mentioned above, 
abnormalities in serotonin metabolism are implicated in depression
62
. At the same 
time, the cognitive model of depression seems to be valid
35
. It would be logical, 
therefore, to examine the relationship between these two elements in research. One 
could investigate the consequences of manipulating serotonin systems with cognition 
as a dependent variable (the effects on cognition of the ingestion of selective 
serotonin re-uptake inhibitors, for instance) or the consequences of manipulating 
cognition with serotonergic functioning as a dependent variable (the effects of 
cognitive challenge on the activity of serotonin-rich areas of the brain in functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging studies perhaps). Similar exercises can be imagined in 
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many areas of psychiatric research – the relationship between dopaminergic systems 
and auditory source monitoring in the context of hallucinations, the relationship 
between information-processing deficits and cognitive biases in the case of delusions. 
Rather than using science as a form of tournament, pitting biological and 
psychological explanatory frameworks against one another, the model presented here 
suggests synergy.  
Finally, there is the beguiling prospect of examining the model directly. The 
notion of a regression equation was introduced earlier. With some care it may be 
possible directly to examine the relative contributions of different classes of factor to 
measurable variance in the observed phenomena of mental disorder. That is not as 
outlandish as it might, at first sight, appear. It is not implied that a full mathematical 
model of mental disorder – or any one category of mental disorder – is possible (or 
that such a model would achieve much). But there are clear and distinct predictions 
emanating from the different models outlined here that could be tested. They could be 
tested because these different models make different predictions as to the relative 
contributions, and the mathematical relationships between, different factors.  
 
Scientifically testing such a model 
The validity of the proposed model rests on its ability to render coherent the 
available evidence of the role of psychological factors in mental disorder and its 
catalytic validity. Catalytic validity
91
 refers to the utility of the analysis in providing 
ways of understanding from which testable implications follow. As examination of 
Figures 1a and 1b reveals, the model presented here invokes the existence of a 
mediating variable. It proposes that all causes of mental disorder are mediated through 
their effects in disturbing or perturbing psychological processes. While Occam‟s razor 
A psychological model of mental disorder 
Page 27 
 
 
declares that a parsimonious (and therefore praiseworthy) scientific hypothesis does 
not unnecessarily multiply causes, the more complex structure proposed in Figure 1b 
is necessary, the inclusion of the mediating variable can be justified. This paper 
argues that the concept of perturbation or disruption of psychological processes is 
logically necessary and empirically justifiable. But, perhaps more importantly, this 
model could be tested. 
Theoretical models, in a scientific paradigm, are useful only if they are 
testable. One, possibly grandiose, test would be to conduct an analysis of the 
statistical relationship between variables. If the model presented here is valid, more of 
the variance in mental disorder (assuming that could validly be measured) could be 
accounted for through a pathway as described in Figure 1b than through that in Figure 
1a (or indeed any other combination of the variables). But such an analysis would, in 
practice, be difficult. It would also be true that the model presented here would be 
falsified if a putative cause (a biological variable, social circumstance or life event) 
were to be demonstrated to be associated with mental disorder without being 
associated with a disturbance or disruption of psychological process.  
But the proposed model generates a variety of less grandiose hypotheses. 
These address the ways in which disruptions or dysfunctions of psychological 
processes impact on mental disorder. In this category, investigations of the 
relationship between different forms of mental disorder and disruptions of the well-
established psychological phenomena discussed above have already proved profitable, 
and could profitably be extended. The ways in which biological factors impact on 
psychological processes could also be investigated. This is less common in 
psychological research, but it seems profitable to explore how biological factors 
implicated in mental disorder impacts on the kinds of psychological processes 
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discussed above. Similar research could address the ways in which social factors 
impact on these psychological processes, and of course on the ways in which life 
events impact on psychological processes.  
One consequence of the model presented here would be a relatively simple 
strategy for would-be researchers: for any example of mental disorder, a cunning 
researcher should examine the literature to identify a psychological process identified 
with that phenomenon. Then, any biological factor, social factor or set of live events 
also associated with that mental disorder would be ideal candidates for a research 
investigation. The model presented here would clearly predict links between these 
biological, social or circumstantial factors and the psychological processes. Any 
revealed associations should develop our understanding of the disorder. A failure to 
discover such links would undermine the model presented here. 
 
Interventions 
As for research, the model presented here would imply a key role for 
psychological factors in therapy. As outlined above, psychological interventions are 
growing in popularity and are increasingly being validated in clinical trials. The 
model presented here explains this, and argues for more of the same. Since 
psychological factors are key, therapeutic manipulation of these factors are key. 
In such a model the role of the health care professional is clarified. In order to 
intervene to improve mental health, one must influence one of the predictor variables. 
In this model, interventions can be thought of as potentially focussed on each of the 
three classes of causal agents, but also on the mediating psychological processes. One 
can imagine a box marked „intervention‟ in Figure 1b, with arrows pointing to each of 
these four elements.  
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 One might even see the roles of different members of the care team as 
addressing these different targets. Thus a medical psychiatrist may prescribe 
medication to alter biological functioning (perhaps even to „correct‟ some presumed 
„underlying abnormality‟).  Within this model, however, it would achieve its benefit 
via a positive impact on mediating psychological processes. Interventions to improve 
the individual‟s environment and social environment (through the actions of many 
members of the care team but principally perhaps social workers) would act similarly. 
Specifically psychological interventions directly target the psychological processes – 
or should do.  
 For individual clinicians, it would imply that cognitive and behavioural 
interventions should be routinely considered for all forms of mental disorder. It does 
not, of course, mean that these would be obligatory, but they should be considered. In 
the UK context (with a highly socialised, state-funded health and social care system) 
this would imply considerable shifts in targets and funding. In other countries, the 
implications may be different, but perhaps even more politically challenging.  
 This structure itself may have utility, making the role of psychological 
approaches coherent. In the hypothetical cases outlined above, one can imagine a 
range of biomedical interventions, from the prescription of Prozac, through the 
application of electro-convulsive therapy to novel and experimental approaches which 
might even address the putative organic causes. One might imagine social 
interventions, from social therapies though systemic changes to radically political, 
service provision or preventative strategies. In the case of experiential causes, the 
range of interventions is similarly broad, from appropriate counselling and service 
provision for people experiencing potentially traumatising or health-threatening 
events to preventative, child-protection strategies. These kinds of interventions are, 
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however, different from (although complementary with) specifically psychological 
interventions. The specific and particular role of psychological interventions is to 
address the disturbances or dysfunctions in psychological functioning.  
Of course, in nearly all treatment settings, genuinely multidisciplinary teams 
operate successfully. How then does the model proposed here extend either routine 
good practice or the more principled application of the biopsychosocial model? First, 
as noted above, many critics of the biopsychosocial model have noted that, in practice 
a presumed biological „primacy‟ in terms of both putative cause and therapeutic 
benefit holds sway
31. Where „psychological‟ formulations or interventions are 
proposed, moreover, these often do not quite take the form proposed here. As 
mentioned above, cognitive behavioural methods and models are now widely 
advocated. Many will see this as a positive move. But the cognitive approach is based 
on one particular set of assumptions – that core dysfunctional beliefs and consequent 
negative automatic thoughts play a key role in the development of mental disorder. 
The present proposed model, of course, incorporates such approaches. However the 
range of possible psychological processes whose disruption or dysfunction could lead 
to mental disorder is much broader than cognitive behavioural formulations alone. 
This subtle shift to the incorporation of other psychological processes (from 
psychodynamic or behavioural orientations for instance) may extend the range, 
subtlety and power of psychologically informed multidisciplinary care plans. 
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Figure 1a: Contributory factors in mental disorder 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b: The central role of psychological processes 
 
 
Disturbed  
       psychological      Mental disorder 
          processes 
Biological factors  
Social factors  
Circumstantial factors  
 
Biological factors  
               
Social factors      Mental disorder 
          
Circumstantial factors  
